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Propaganda presents a problem. By assumption, propaganda bypasses reason. But how do 
propagandistic arguments compel? To make the matter more puzzling, propaganda often 
compels in the mask of reason. Consider Frederick Hoffmann’s 1896 book, Race Traits of the 
American Negro. In it, Hoffmann argues that Black people have less “vital force” than white 
people. This is a work of scientific racism, a work of racial propaganda, filled with statistics and 
massive amounts of evidence. In one chapter, Hoffmann argues that Black people have 
“excessive mortality.” In another, he argues that Black people have vastly greater propensity 
towards criminality.  In each case, he claims that there is no environmental explanation - for 
example, he argues that “[i]n Washington, the colored race has had exceptional educational, 
religious, and social opportunities”, and so environment cannot explain racial differences in 
arrests. In his discussion of mortality, he argues that relevant white and Black populations in his 
studies have the same environmental conditions. Hoffmann’s book is presented as the epitome of 
reason. And yet it is racial propaganda.  
 In his discussion of Hoffmann’s book, the historian Khalil Muhammad (2010) provides a 
clue about why Hoffmann’s book is propaganda, and how it uses the appearance of reason to be 
convincing. In his work, Hoffmann repeatedly argues that white European immigrant 
populations in Northern cities face worse social and environmental conditions than Blacks. And 
Hoffman argues that the solution to analogous social problems for these communities is an 
improved environment. In other words, Hoffmann’s work presupposes a stereotype about Black 
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people, one that imprints itself on the very evidence he gathers. This stereotype rules out 
environmental explanations of high Black mortality or crime rates, they rule such environmental 
explanations out as implausible from the beginning. But the stereotype is not present for 
immigrant populations. With immigrant populations, Hoffmann is suddenly able to recognize 
environmental conditions that explain social problems. Such background stereotypes mask the 
reality that flies in the face of the conclusion of the argument. In The Mismeasure of Man, 
Stephen Jay Gould provides similar explanations for other examples of scientific racism—for 
example, in discussing Samuel George Morton’s craniometry studies, he shows that Morton 
gathered his evidence on the assumption that Black skulls would be smaller, ruling out larger 
Black skulls as corruptions of the data pool (Gould, 1981, p. 65). 
 Propaganda in fact characteristically appeals to virtuous ideals—an ideal of reason, or 
humanity, or freedom—in the service of a goal that is inconsistent with that ideal. Nazi political 
theorist Carl Schmitt writes: 
 
Humanity as such cannot wage war because it has no enemy....That wars are waged in the 
name of humanity is not a contradiction of this simple truth; quite the contrary, it has an 
especially intensive political meaning. When a state fights its political enemy in the name 
of humanity, it is not a war for the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a particular state 
seeks to usurp a universal concept against its military opponent. At the expense of its 
opponent, it tries to identify itself with humanity in the same way as one can misuse 
peace, justice, progress, and civilization in order to claim these as one’s own and to deny 




Propaganda functions by exploiting stereotypes that mask reality—for example, the humanity of 
an enemy. In his 1852 speech, “What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?,” Frederick Douglass 
wonders how the founders could have venerated liberty and yet tolerated slavery. His answer is 
that they suffered under stereotypes that justified racial hierarchies.1 Propaganda typically 
employs a logic of what Stanley (2015) calls “undermining,” where flawed stereotypes, or 
ideologies, allow a virtuous ideal to be employed in the service of a goal that is inconsistent with 
it.2 The persuasiveness of propaganda involves stereotypes, and the appeal to ideals that seem 
inconsistent with those stereotypes. To study propaganda is to study this process of the formation 
of stereotypes and their employment, often necessarily masked, in propaganda. 
 The theory of meaning enters in at a number of junctures in the study of propaganda. 
First, there are linguistic techniques to mask problematic stereotypes, allowing them to enter in 
unchallenged. Thus, theorists of meaning who have studied propaganda have focused on 
linguistic ways to smuggle in content. In her 1999 paper, “Ideology and the Persuasive Use of 
Presupposition”, Marina Sbisà argues that presupposition accommodation is central to many 
cases of political propaganda. On her account, strategic use of presupposition is a characteristic 
way to smuggle controversial normative presuppositions into political debate. For example, 
consider being asked, “What is your solution to the Jewish Question?” In their classic study of 
pornography as propaganda, Rae Langton and Caroline West argue that propaganda is effective 
as a way to denegrate women by leading its consumers to accommodate sexist presuppositions 
(Langton & West, 1999). Masking can also occur in other ways, including “dog whistles” that 
allow speakers to deny that they appealed to such stereotypes, such as “inner city” used to 
 
1 Douglass takes care to note that these stereotypes did not prevent white Americans from recognizing that Black 
persons had human agency - since they had laws that punished them for misbehavior.  
2 See also Marques (2020) on “meaning perversions.”  
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convey a racial message (see Stanley 2015, Khoo 2017, Saul 2018); and other linguistic devices, 
such as what Saul (2017) calls “racial figleaves.” The study of the linguistic means to mask 
stereotypes or render them difficult to challenge is a task for the theory of meaning. 
 There are also linguistic processes at work in the formation of stereotypes, such as the 
formation of friend–enemy distinctions, or the justification of various hierarchies. The function 
of slurs is important here, and the question of how slurs contribute to this process is also a 
question for the theory of meaning.  
Finally, the study of propaganda challenges the theory of meaning (Beaver & Stanley, 
2018, forthcoming). Standardly, the theory of meaning has focused on cases of cooperative, 
rational, transparent communication, between a speaker and a hearer. Propaganda, on the other 
hand, involves a speaker (or perhaps more accurately, an author) that's rarely a single individual 
and an audience that's typically an entire community or at least a group within that community. 
It's much less clear whether the communication of propaganda still involves, for example, 
hearers' identifying the speaker's communicative intention, and the speaker's and hearers' mutual 
knowledge of such a communicative intention.3 
The study of propaganda involves understanding the communicative processes in 
persuading people by bypassing rationality. It has led philosophers and linguists to add new 
elements to the theory of meaning, such as Elizabeth Camp’s notion of a perspective (Camp, 
2013), introduced to explain the communicative effect of slurs. And it has led theorists of 
meaning to alter their understanding of classic notions, such as Sbisà’s argument that propaganda 
 
3 Terence Moran (1979) theorizes propaganda as “pseudocommunication” and identifies ten distinctions between 
communication and pseudocommunication, including features related to the control of discourse, the stated and 
observed goals, the kinds of symbols used, and the kinds of justification offered and reasoning encouraged. Stanley 
Cunningham (2002) has similarly argued that propaganda is at best pseudocommunication. Like Moran's, 
Cunningham's argument relies on identifying communication in terms of certain norms and values which 
propaganda violates (pp. 176–78).  
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forces us to recognize a normative character to the rule of accommodation (Sbisà, 1999), or the 
more dramatic reworking of the theory of presupposition and accommodation in Beaver and 
Stanley (forthcoming). In studying propaganda, theorists of meaning continue a long tradition of 
inquiry. We may have new terms, such as “fake news,” or study it in piecemeal, as in the case of 
slurs.4 But in studying these phenomena, theorists of meaning connect to a longer tradition. Our 
goal in this chapter is to contextualize and systematize this study in the context of its recent 
history. 
 
1. Propaganda's Epistemic or Rational Harms 
There is a long tradition of defining propaganda in terms of its epistemic or rational 
defects, and taking this characteristic to distinguish propaganda from rational persuasion or 
education. Indeed, in 1932 Bertrand Russell wrote that emotional propaganda is dangerous 
because "it tends to close the mind to argument" (p. 217), and Hitler himself noted in Mein 
Kampf that propaganda is not the medium of rational reflection: “The function of propaganda is 
... not to weigh and ponder the rights of different people, but exclusively to emphasize the one 
right which it has set out to argue for. Its task is not to make an objective study of the truth ... its 
task is to serve our own right, always and unflinchingly" (1925, p. 182).  
Propaganda is often thought to be persuasion that merely asserts a conclusion without 
offering an argument or reasons in support. But propaganda can present its audiences with 
arguments—arguments whose persuasive force depends not on their soundness, but on some 
other appeal which allows them to affect audiences' beliefs, attitudes, sentiments, or behavior. 
This view of propaganda as irrational persuasion appears at least as early as 1933, when the 
 
4 For recent literature on “fake news,” see Gelfert (2018); Pepp, Michaelson, and Sterken (2020); and Rini (2017). 
For the argument that this literature is really just the study of propaganda, see Habgood-Coote (2019). 
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sociologist Frederick Lumley identified the content of propaganda as "unsupported, partially 
supported, or trickily supported conclusions" (pp. 148–49).  
Also part of this view of propaganda is the idea that propaganda “closes minds” by 
precluding rational engagement, or as Lumley put it, by “making further thought unnecessary” 
(p. 149). Not long after, the psychologist F. C. Bartlett developed this view in more detail, 
describing the ways in which propaganda "strives continually to paralyse critical analysis and to 
stimulate all tendencies to thoughtless and slavish acceptance" (1940, p. 66).  
This view of propaganda as bypassing rationality has remained reliably popular. Several 
decades after the emergence of propaganda scholarship, Jacques Ellul, one of the most influential 
propaganda theorists, reiterated that propaganda "must constantly short-circuit all thought and 
decision” and work “at the level of the unconscious" (1965, p. 27). Ellul also identified a key 
psychological effect which enables propaganda to circumvent reason—which he called 
"crystallization," a process of organizing and entrenching stereotypes and other patterns of 
thought and action. Ellul’s concept of crystallization plays the role that ideology does in other 
theories of propaganda (e.g. Stanley, 2015). As a result, propaganda obviates critical reflection, 
"hardens prevailing stereotypes, and ... codifies social, political, and moral standards" (Ellul, 
1965, p. 163). This crystallization of stereotypes—or ideology—makes propaganda effective. 
And propaganda itself further reinforces the very structures that make it effective in the first 
place. 
Norms of rationality continue to play a central role in more recent and contemporary 
theories of propaganda. For example, both Ted J. Smith III and J. Michael Sproule take the lack 
of sufficient reason or evidence as propaganda's central feature (Smith, 1989, p. 81; Sproule, 
1994, p. 6). In the same spirit, Sheryl Tuttle Ross describes propaganda as “epistemically 
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defective or lacking epistemic merit,” not only when it’s false, but also when there’s no rational 
connection between the target belief and other beliefs (2002, p. 23). In one of the most detailed 
such accounts, Stanley Cunningham identifies an abundance of epistemic norms that propaganda 
violates: "it cultivates confusion; it exploits expectations; it poses as information and knowledge; 
... it systematically disregards superior epistemic values such as truth and truthfulness, 
understanding and knowledge; it discourages rationality, reasoning, and a healthy respect for 
rigor, evidence, and procedural safeguards; it promotes the easy acceptance of unexamined 
beliefs and supine ignorance" (2002, p. 176).5  
In a more recent elaboration of this view of propaganda as circumventing reason, 
philosopher Randal Marlin explains that propaganda can in fact bypass reason even as it appeals 
to reason, because the irrational effects are produced by the inclusion of “a hidden, misleading, 
or otherwise unexamined presupposition” which affects audiences’ reasoning in ways of which 
they’re not conscious (2013, p. 12). Propaganda can thus disguise itself as cooperative 
communication, purporting to offer rational arguments while in reality offering arguments that 
rely on various irrational techniques which we discuss throughout this chapter—such as framing, 
loaded language, stereotypes, symbols, innuendo, scientific-seeming data—to sway audiences to 
draw certain conclusions which they wouldn't draw on solely rational grounds 
An ideology is a set of practices, including linguistic practices, that embed stereotypes 
and social meanings into actions (including speech acts). To summarize the above discussion - 
propaganda’s effectiveness relies on ideology (Stanley (2015)). It is because of ideology that 
propaganda can hide its unreason under the cloak of universal reason, its partiality under the 
mask of universality.  
 
5 See also Stanley, 2015, pp. 197–216, explaining the epistemic harms resulting from holding flawed ideological 
beliefs, which undermining propaganda exploits and promulgates. 
8 
 
Ideology assigns authority, characteristically illegitimate authority, to certain positions in 
society; for example, patriarchal ideology assigns special authority to men. The effectiveness of 
propaganda typically involves associating the source or content of its message with ideological 
sources of authority. Like the other techniques we've considered so far, this presents 
propagandistic claims as more reliable, or arguments as more reasonable, than in fact they are, 
thereby bypassing audiences' rational faculties. Bartlett, for example, describes propaganda as 
most often taking the form of suggestion "based upon a relationship of superiors and inferiors" 
analogous to a doctor-patient relationship (1940, pp. 51–52). The propagandists' having or at 
least arrogating some status or position above the audience lends their proposal an air of 
trustworthiness and expertise, or even more simply provides the role model audiences are 
implicitly or explicitly encouraged to follow.6 Rae Langton ascribes the effectiveness of the Nazi 
propaganda of Julius Streicher in part to its strategic conflation of epistemic and practical 
authority. Its perceived epistemic authority comes from its source, the ruling political party, and 
that in turn gives it its practical authority (Langton, 2018). This use of an authority stance is 
perhaps most obvious in propaganda openly issued by governments or private institutions. 
However, even anti-establishment propaganda can use prestige to bolster its influence. 
Though these conceptions of propaganda focus on propagandees' coming to believe in 
certain ways, propaganda needn't instill beliefs in order to produce epistemic or rational harms. 
Instead, it might pursue a more limited goal—instilling doubt. Because it doesn't require 
convincing audiences of any specific, refutable claims, this goal is more attainable now that 
audiences can easily access competing views and additional information online. The motto of 
 
6 There is a debate about how essential such practical authority is to the effectiveness of propaganda. Langton 
(1993) argues that subordinating speech, pornography in particular, requires some sort of authority or social status in 
order to be efficacious. Butler (1997, p. 86ff.) contests the centrality of authority required by Langton. Maitra (2012) 
argues that speech can be subordinating even if the speaker lacks authority.  
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RT, Russia’s propaganda station, is “Question More”. Stanley writes, describing its propaganda 
effects: 
RT’s strategy was not devised to produce knowledge. It was rather devised as a 
propaganda technique, to undermine trust in basic democratic institutions. Objective truth 
is drowned out in the resulting cacophony of voices. The effect of RT, as well as the 
myriad conspiracy-theory-producing websites across the world, including in the United 
States, has been to destabilize the kind of shared reality that is in fact required for 
democratic contestation. (2018, p. 68)7 
Yet another set of irrational effects of propaganda concern not the accuracy or reliability 
of a claim, but rather who gains from audiences' coming to believe a certain way. That is, 
propaganda also bypasses or actively sabotages audiences' rationality when it persuades them to 
form beliefs, attitudes, or intentions to act in ways that are counter to their own interests (though 
it is a thorny matter to characterize the relevant sense of “interest”). Here we see another clear 
contrast between propaganda and ideal, cooperative communication: Whatever the audience 
interests might be, propaganda aims to further the propagandist's interests only; it's disinterested 
or even opposed to the interests of the audience. Cooperative communication, on the other hand, 
is typically assumed to serve the speaker's and hearer's shared interests.  
 
1.1 Disguised and Covert Propaganda 
We began with the example of scientific racism, which is an instance of propaganda 
presented as something else—as true, informative, as making a rational appeal or argument, or as 
 
7 See Pomerantsev (2014, 2019) for the best accessible accounts of RT.  
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being cooperative communication. Propaganda used in mass communication also employs this 
effect, as when xenophobic attacks on immigrants are presented as public health warnings about 
disease, for example. For J. Michael Sproule, this covertness—propaganda presented as 
something other than propaganda—is key evidence of the manipulative nature of propaganda, 
and the ability to bypass reason that this covertness enables is in turn precisely what 
distinguishes propaganda from rational persuasion: "Whereas the direct persuasion of a speech 
alerts our critical faculties that someone is trying to win us over, propaganda's covertness hides 
the manipulative element in mass communication" (1994, p. 3). Indeed, as Randal Marlin 
observes, such covertness is crucial for achieving propaganda's effects: "For propaganda to be 
successful, a targeted audience must not recognize what is communicated as propaganda" (2014, 
p. 187). 
There are distinct theories about the mechanisms that undergird propaganda’s covertness. 
Of course, we may expect multiple mechanisms to be in play. For example, even theorists 
focusing on other mechanisms would not deny that propaganda often relies on presupposition. 
One set of linguistic mechanisms are those introducing not-at-issue content: presupposition and 
various forms of conventional implicature, such as nonrestrictive relative clauses and 
appositives, expressives, epithets and honorifics. The content contributed by these kinds of 
expressions includes both at-issue content, which addresses the Question Under Discussion, and 
not-at-issue content, which does not.8 Unlike at-issue content, not-at-issue content is added 
directly to the common ground of a conversation, without the speaker's explicitly proposing and 
 
8 On not-at-issue content generally, see Simons, Tonhauser, Beaver, and Roberts (2010), who employ the Question 
Under Discussion theory of discourse structure from Roberts (1996) and argue that what's common to the varieties 
of conventional implicature identified in Potts (2005) is this pragmatic property of not-at-issueness. For a more 
thorough discussion of propagandistic uses of not-at-issue content, see Stanley (2015), pp. 130–69. 
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hearer's accepting the addition.9 This allows a propagandist to subtly produce certain effects on 
the audience, without the accountability that would typically accompany making that content at-
issue.   
Not-at-issue content can be introduced in more or less subtle ways. At one end of the 
spectrum, emotions and normative beliefs or attitudes evoked by caricatures and stereotypes are 
typically blatant, though still distinct from their descriptive content. At the other, the normative 
or affective impact of symbolic and loaded language—like euphemisms, epithets, dog whistles, 
and other expressions with strong connotations or robust social meaning—may go unnoticed 
even by those who respond strongly to it. Further examples of this kind of language are Name 
Calling and Glittering Generalities, two of the seven classic techniques of propaganda identified 
by the Institute of Propaganda Analysis in 1937. These devices function to sway audiences by 
associating the referent with certain ideals—whether vices, as in Name Calling with phrases like 
"Fascist, demagogue, dictator, Red," or virtues, as in Glittering Generalities like "truth, freedom, 
honor, liberty, social justice" and "the American way." Stanley (2015, Chapter 4) uses not-at-
issue content to analyze code words and dog-whistles.  
Other theorists identify pragmatic linguistic mechanisms as enabling propaganda’s 
covertness. Justin Khoo (2017) rejects the view that code words are best to be understood in 
terms of not-at-issue content (what he calls the “multidimensionality theory of code words”). 
Not-at-issue content is characteristically non-cancelable. For example, it’s odd to say (1), but 
perfectly fine to utter (2) (Ibid., p. 55): 
(1) John stopped smoking. He never smoked at all. 
 
9 This notion of common ground is due to Stalnaker (1978).  
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(2) Our welfare system provides needed services to many unfairly disadvantaged 
citizens. Every negative stereotype about poor Black people is false. 
If “welfare” were a code word for negative stereotypes about poor Black Americans, (2) would 
be problematic to utter in the way (1) is. On Khoo’s view of code words, the felicity of (2) shows 
that the negative stereotypes that may be triggered by uttering “welfare” are in no way 
semantically encoded. Rather, code words invite their audiences to draw certain inferences from 
their pre-existing stereotypical beliefs, but these inferences remain independent of code words’ 
content.  
The mechanism Khoo identifies is not limited to code words. Framing effects and "spin" 
also subtly encourage the audience to draw certain inferences, without the propagandist having to 
outright present them for more careful consideration. Consider, for example, the difference 
George Lakoff (2001) notes between framing the September 11th attacks as an act of war, versus 
as a crime: "The crime frame entails law, courts, lawyers, trials, sentencing, appeals, and so on." 
The "war" frame, on the other hand, involves "'casualties,' 'enemies,' 'military action,' 'war 
powers,'" and shifts the appropriate response from the courts to the military.10  
Garth Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell argue that such framing effects can shape not only 
audiences' cognitions, but also their perceptions, citing as examples "perception-shaping phrases 
that sanitize the reality of war" like "'collateral damage' standing for civilians killed or injured; 
'friendly fire' for soldiers killed or injured by troops from their side; 'turkey run' for randomly 
killing a massive number of people; and 'sorties' for bombing missions," as well as "military 
acronyms such as WMD and IED" (2015, p. 10). They argue that propaganda manipulates 
cognitions by targeting perceptions (or vice versa) because the two interact within a single 
 




complex process; cognitions (and more generally, attitudes) are based in part on perceptions, but 
existing beliefs or attitudes in turn influence how we perceive the world (Ibid., p. 12. See also 
Stanley, 2015, pp. 211–16). 
Another pragmatic account of some of the language of propaganda is offered by Jennifer 
Saul (2018), who argues that dog-whistling is a kind of perlocutionary speech act, one which is 
successfully performed only when the performance is covert, or not consciously noticed by the 
audience. On this account, one can explain the “cancelability” of dog-whistling and code words 
as in (2) because the utterance in (2) is not a dog-whistling speech act of this kind.  
According to the theory in Beaver and Stanley (forthcoming), code words and dog-
whistles do encode negative messages as part of their not-at-issue content. But Beaver and 
Stanley adjust the theory of not-at-issue content to give it the flexibility to account for what 
appears to be cancelability, by incorporating a speech-act theoretic account into not-at-issue 
content. 
Whether these mechanisms are semantic or pragmatic, what they ultimately have in 
common is that they allow the propagandist to connote certain normative claims without having 
to assert them, thereby hiding the manipulative aspect of propaganda (Sbisà, 1999). As F. C. 
Bartlett pointed out in 1940, symbols are effective propagandistic devices precisely because their 
ability to convey more than one meaning allows the propagandist to hide the manipulative aspect 
of the message beneath its surface-level meaning: "Indirect suggestion looks always as if it is 
aiming at one thing, but its real purpose is something different. ... It is the mark of the symbol 
always to have at least two meanings: one of them looks to be obvious and open to everybody, 
but the other produces effects without ever coming out into the light" (p. 63).  
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Formal models of discourse structure can help clarify how these strategies work. For 
example, we might view propagandistic spin from within Craige Roberts' theory of discourse as 
structured by a series of motivating questions which the participants are interested in answering. 
On this view, what the propagandist does is subtly, even covertly, change the Question Under 
Discussion (QUD), by saying something which answers a different question than the one that has 
actually been structuring the discourse up to that point. The implicit proposal to change to the 
QUD is often simply accommodated by hearers, and so may easily go unnoticed. At the same 
time, the choice of QUD makes a difference to whether some discourse is manipulative. The 
speaker's implicit QUD may automatically rule out certain answers in a way that precludes the 
audience from being able to fully rationally evaluate the matter, but because the change in QUD 
remains implicit, the claim may seem neutral. 
A similar mechanism—implicitly ruling out certain answers without even considering 
them—is at play in censorship and biased reporting. Messages produced under these conditions 
are propagandistic when they oversimplify reality, while at the same time are presented as being 
rational, informative, or cooperative communication. Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky 
(1988) argue this form of propaganda also encompasses other, more subtle ways in which 
individuals and institutions with political and economic power constrain mass media to stifle 
dissent and preclude debate, such as ownership of the media by wealthy elites and media's 
reliance on advertising for income. These conditions, like outright censorship and bias, also 
produce messages which purport to be informative but are actually one-sided. Such propaganda 
is manipulative and epistemically harmful because it "irrationally closes off certain options that 
should be considered," in Stanley's words, thereby persuading audiences to accept a view on 
poor grounds (2015, p. 49). 
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Lastly, propaganda's being manipulative is not the only thing that's often hidden. The 
more common form of propaganda today is covert or "black" propaganda, in which the author or 
source of the propaganda is hidden (as contrasted with the overt or "white" propaganda  issued 
by self-identified ministries of propaganda during WWI and II).11 Covert propaganda can take 
the form of whisper campaigns and rumors, or it can simply be presented as coming from a 
different source than it actually does (for example, from a panel of experts, rather than from a 
corporation). This form of propaganda is useful in part because the audience's inability to 
identify the source makes it that much harder to check the truth or reliability of the claims made. 
But it’s also useful because, unlike in cooperative communication, the audience of covert 
propaganda cannot know the speaker's intentions. Thus, it’s particularly difficult to rationally 
evaluate the reliability of such propaganda’s claims, even apart from questions of fact. The result 
is that when it's effective, such covert propaganda leads the audience to think that the acquired 
belief or attitude is their own. 
 
1.2 False or Misleading Propaganda 
Besides hiding its argumentative or manipulative nature, yet another way propaganda 
bypasses reason is by spreading false beliefs or encouraging irrational inferences. However, it's a 
misconception that propaganda must be false. (See, e.g., Ellul, 1965, pp. 52–54; Stanley, 2015, 
pp. 42–43.) More often, propagandistic assertions are neither clearly false nor clearly true. Such 
'gray' propaganda or disinformation may convey a mix of truths and falsehoods, or even just 
carefully selected truths, with the overall effect of misleading the audience or presenting 
information whose reliability is uncertain. Simplification is one classic propagandistic technique 
 
11 Indeed, one of the earliest theorists of propaganda and one of the founders of Public Relations, Ivy Lee, identified 
the "failure to disclose the source of information" as "the essential evil of propaganda." Lee (1925), p. 23. 
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that can mislead or manipulate audiences without asserting any falsehoods.12 Propaganda can 
also make use of literally true claims. In fact, truths will often make for more effective 
propaganda than falsehoods, as apparently Lenin and Goebbels both recognized, because they're 
harder for audiences to reject or discount.13  
Other propagandistic messages are simply not truth-evaluable, such as slogans in the 
form of imperatives—"Don't tread on me," "Proletariat of the world, unite!" and "Make America 
Great Again,"—or otherwise falling short of the subject–predicate sentence form—"liberté, 
égalité, fraternité" (liberty, equality, brotherhood) in the French Revolution or "ein Volk, ein 
Reich, ein Führer" (one people, one empire, one leader) in the Third Reich.14 Symbols more 
generally are particularly useful in propaganda for this very reason: An audience thinking in 
terms of abstract, vague symbols is easier to manipulate, because it's harder to check whether a 
claim is true when it involves symbols like liberty or equality.15  
Propaganda's use of narratives, and especially revisionist histories, similarly complicates 
the question of its truth or falsity. Political scientists James Combs and Dan Nimmo identify the 
suspension of disbelief as a key technique for making propaganda appealing and effective, one 
for which the narrative form is particularly well-suited (1993, p. 89).16 Narrative form also 
provides unique opportunities for misleading and manipulating, related to the technique of 
framing we discussed earlier. For example, which events are included or excluded from a 
 
12 See, e.g., Doob (1950), p. 436, reporting Goebbels' description of propaganda as "painting in black and white," 
and Ellul (1965), pp. 146–47, explaining how propaganda relieves the anxiety of too much information in a complex 
world by offering simple answers to difficult questions.  
13 Ellul attributes to Lenin the dictum that "in propaganda, truth pays off" (1965, p. 53), and Doob reports that 
Goebbels advised true claims to be used as much as possible (1950, p. 428). 
14 Slogans like these are neither true nor false not only because they do not predicate anything of a subject, but also 
because they seem to have a normative, rather than a descriptive, force. Paraphrasing the former as "There is liberty, 
equality, brotherhood" just doesn't seem to be what the revolutionaries meant. 
15 Of course, symbols are also useful because they appeal to audiences' emotions. We return to this point below. 
16 See also Balkin (1998, Chapter 9, “Narrative Expectation”) for a profound discussion of how narratives make 
messaging familiar and persuasive. 
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narrative can radically shift both the emotional impact and the moral that the audience will take 
away. Combs and Nimmo note that narrative form expands the range of techniques available to a 
propagandist, to include not only verbal content, but also gestures, which like dog whistles and 
symbols, "convey meanings often quite apart from their apparent ones.” Combs and Nimmo thus 
show how propaganda can bypass rationality by taking the narrative form: “Persuasion is less 
information oriented than persona and performance oriented. ... the purpose of the spectacle, or 
story, is to override disconfirming facts" (1993, p. 120).  
Propaganda thus challenges not only theories of meaning, but theories of truth as well. 
Propagandistic use of narratives is but one kind of case in which a simple correspondence theory 
of truth cannot suffice to explain the way in which propaganda is false, or at least inaccurate. As 
Cunningham observes, a pragmatist or coherence theory of truth could capture a kind of 
truthfulness that propaganda shares with civic rhetoric: "Goebbels, agitators, and political 
advertisers may indeed defend their messages as conducive to desires or socially desirable results 
... or they may champion their message as consistent with other reports and ideologies" (2002, p. 
112). Moreover, the coherence in question needn't be restricted to coherence among beliefs; good 
propaganda, at least, certainly exhibits an emotional coherence as well. 
Propaganda also dramatizes the interaction between semantics and pragmatics, and the 
communicative functions made possible by this interaction. Like the use of narrative form, the 
various techniques for adding not-at-issue content to a discourse, or inviting inferences, 
discussed above, enable speakers or authors to produce messages that are half-true, or true but 
misleading. Innuendo is another way that literally true claims can function as propaganda. For 
example, Stanley invites us to consider "a non-Muslim politician in the United States saying, 
'There are Muslims among us'" (2015, pp. 42–43; also see Ellul, 1965, pp. 56–57). The literal 
18 
 
truth or falsity of such an utterance doesn’t yet tell us whether or why it’s propaganda. Innuendo, 
among other propagandistic techniques employing truths, thus highlights the limited explanatory 
power of semantic notions alone.  Explaining why a claim like this is propaganda will need to 
involve something besides the semantic content, value, or meaning of the words involved. 
Gricean conversational maxims might be able to do this explanatory work; perhaps an utterance 
of "There are Muslims among us" violates the principle of relevance or quality by stating the 
obvious, and hearers thus interpret the utterance as implicating something more than just its 
literal meaning. 
Moreover, the pragmatic effects of some utterances derive not from their semantic 
content, but instead from a lack of certain content. Eric Swanson (2017) has shown that an 
important category of propaganda can be explained in terms of broadly Gricean notions—in 
terms of what he calls omissive implicature. As he explains, the Nazis often implicated 
permission for violent actions of their supporters by not apologizing for them: 
The omission of an apology when it’s manifest that one is expected conveys, through 
omissive implicature, that the speaker (or would-be speaker, if the relevant 
conversational participant is silent) does not have sufficient reason to apologize, because 
the speaker (or would-be speaker) is thwarting the manifest expectation of an apology. So 
by failing to apologize for the ‘excesses of the lower ranks,’ the Nazis implicated that 
they did not have sufficient reason to so apologize. This omissive implicature in turn 
invites interpreters to strengthen the implicature by asking: why not? By failing to 
apologize, did the Nazis implicate that they did nothing wrong? (Swanson, 2017, p. 129) 
Swanson’s discussion reveals the point familiar from propaganda studies: What’s left unsaid can 
be the propagandizing (e.g. Stanley (2015, p. 55). 
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A further complication is that propaganda can also use truths sincerely, where the 
audience hears a true fact without innuendo or implicature. One form of this kind of propaganda 
is what Jacques Ellul calls rational propaganda, which is "based exclusively on facts, statistics, 
economic ideas" that—at least on their face—appeal to reason (1965, p. 84). However, since 
most in the audience aren't technical experts, the rational aspect of such propaganda is spurious. 
What makes rational propaganda effective is not the objective, scientific, or factual 
argumentation, but rather the impression of truth and reliability. "What remains with the 
individual affected by this propaganda is a perfectly irrational picture, a purely emotional 
feeling, a myth. The facts, the data, the reasoning—all are forgotten, and only the impression 
remains.... Thus propaganda in itself becomes honest, strict, exact, but its effect remains 
irrational" (Ellul, 1965, p. 86).17 
Another propagandistic use of truths is in bureaucratic propaganda, a notion theorized by 
the sociologists David Altheide and John Johnson. They define bureaucratic propaganda as "any 
report produced by an organization for evaluation and other practical purposes that is targeted for 
individuals, committees, or publics who are unaware of its promotive character and the editing 
processes that shaped the report" (Altheide and Johnson, 1980, p. 5). For example, Altheide and 
Johnson discuss the inflation of crime statistics by police departments to acquire federal grants or 
the deflation of the same statistics to manage the reputation of a city (Ibid., pp. 23–24). Echoing 
 
17 See also Bartlett (1940), pp. 93–4, citing William Albig, Public Opinion (1939), p. 319, in his explanation of how 
statistical data helps bypass reason: "Yet comparatively few people are given much genuine facility in the 
management of numbers, and fewer still are afforded any opportunity to understand critically the use of even the 
simplest kinds of statistical measurements. When a statement is 'quantified' it seems to carry, to the majority of 
persons, a superior certainty, and it passes without question." In his description of rational propaganda, Randal 
Marlin also emphasizes the discrepancy between its content seeming to appeal to rationality and its actual effects 
bypassing rational faculties: "Rational propaganda has the appearance of genuine scientific truth, but it is often 
mystification. Citations of facts and figures leave the impression of great rationality, but the hearer is unable or 
unwilling to analyze the figures and is persuaded by the appearance of rationality rather than by coming to grips 
with genuine reality." Marlin (2013), p. 29. 
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Ellul's idea that propaganda takes a utilitarian attitude toward truth, they observe that 
"bureaucratic propaganda uses truth for organizational goals ... by presenting managed and often 
contrived reports as though they were done 'scientifically' and therefore depict 'objective' truth" 
(Ibid., p. 23).18A related kind of propaganda, the subject of Stanley (2016), is technocratic 
propaganda, where decisions are presented as the result of a kind of technocratic decision 
making whose details are not accessible to non-experts. 
Ultimately, these kinds of propaganda persuade not by offering good reasons, but by 
embodying the authority of objective, factual data. Despite occasionally relying on true claims, 
these techniques are still aimed at bypassing rationality, like the other, more obviously 
manipulative ones. 
 
1.3 Propaganda's Exploiting Emotion 
Besides manipulating audiences into believing incorrectly or reasoning irrationally, 
propaganda also bypasses audiences' rational faculties by appealing to or exploiting their 
emotions and sentiments. Note that this set of techniques and the ones described in the preceding 
two sub-sections are not merely compatible, but synergistic. Indeed, writing in 1962, Ellul had 
already noticed that "purely impassioned and emotional propaganda is disappearing" and that 
"Hitler's most inflammatory speeches always contained some facts which served as base or 
pretext" (p. 85).19 Even rational propaganda, which, as we discuss above, presents audiences 
with facts and seemingly rational appeals, ultimately relies on emotional pressure to incite action 
(Ellul, 1965, p. 86).  
 
18 See also Cunningham (2002), pp. 166–67, 176, writing, "It handles truths and information as mere instruments"; 
and Doob (1950), p. 428, describing propaganda's focus on expediency, not morality, as the rationale for using truth 
as frequently as possible, and p. 433, recounting Goebbels' dictum that credibility matters more than actual truth. 
19 Ellul's Propaganda was first published in French in 1962. 
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Propaganda often appeals to emotion precisely in order to manipulate audiences into 
accepting falsehoods or drawing irrational inferences. Bartlett, for example, points out that 
whether or not propaganda offers an argument or merely asserts a claim, its acceptance relies on 
the existence of "some approved outburst of popular emotion" (1940, pp. 73–74). Appeals to 
emotion are also key according to Stanley, who notes that propaganda's persuasive force lies not 
in its providing reasons, but rather in its "seeking to overload various affective capacities, such as 
nostalgia, sentiment, or fear" (2015, pp. 53). Propaganda’s reliance on emotional appeals also 
highlights the priority of emotional coherence and efficacy, rather than rational coherence and 
truth. At the same time, if exploiting emotions is propaganda’s central goal, then it becomes clear 
when and why truth is valuable to the propagandist: Propaganda employs true claims not with an 
eye to the epistemic virtues of rational persuasion, but only when they’re the more effective way 
to achieve the propagandist’s goal. 
A number of theorists agree that propaganda can't create completely new sentiments in its 
audience, but instead must use and reshape existing ones.20 So, propaganda can mobilize 
audiences' existing emotional associations with certain people, things, words, concepts, or 
images, or it can displace existing emotions from one object or issue to another, or from one part 
to the rest.21 In particular, it often aims to transfer reasonable emotions to a new object in an 
unreasonable way. For example, propaganda may take anxiety about an uncertain economic 
future, and attach it to immigrants as the source.  
The emotional force attached to a propagandistic message can also mask the fact that the 
audience is being persuaded to believe or act in ways that serve not their interests, but those of 
 
20 For but a few examples, see Russell (1932), p. 211; Bartlett (1940), pp. 56–57; and Ellul (1965), pp. 33–36, 49. 
21 See, for example, Russell (1932), p. 215; Bartlett (1940), pp. 60–63; and the discussion of Transfer, one of the 7 
propagandistic devices identified in Institute of Propaganda Analysis, 1937, p. 6. 
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the propagandist. One technique particularly useful to this end is appealing to in-group 
sentiments or stereotypes about out-groups. Such appeals can distract audiences from some 
internal threat by shifting their discontent onto a scapegoat. They can also encourage action 
which, though it's at the out-group's expense, is actually counter to the in-group's interest.     
More generally, propaganda's use of emotion allows it to bypass rationality because the 
emotional force helps mask the irrational aspects of propaganda, such as simplification, 
exaggeration, lack of argument or supporting reasons. As Bartlett argues, were it not for this 
emotional impact, propaganda's rational or epistemic deficiencies would surface and would 
"excite at least as much popular criticism as any other form of statement" (1940, p. 78). 
Emotional appeals can thus help bypass rationality not only directly, but also indirectly by 
bolstering another technique already discussed above—masking the persuasive and manipulative 
aspects of propaganda. 
Many of the linguistic techniques we've already discussed above also work to activate 
and exploit emotions in the service of propagandistic manipulation—framing and spin; loaded 
language like euphemisms, epithets, and stereotypes; symbols and metaphors; and claims to 
authority. Symbols are perhaps the most clearly useful for such emotional appeals, as their 
contribution to discourse consists not of propositional, truth-conditional content, but rather of 
values, norms, ideals, and more generally affective elements. We’ve already seen propaganda's 
reliance on single words referring to broad, vague, and normatively-laden concepts, such as 
"freedom" or "democracy," as well as slogans like"Don't tread on me," "Proletariat of the world, 
unite!" and "Make America Great Again." Such loaded, symbolic language bypasses audiences’ 
critical faculties by encouraging them to transfer sentiments or emotions from one object or issue 
to another. The influential journalist and political commentator Walter Lippmann, for example, 
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identifies the centrality of symbols to propaganda’s ability to exploit pre-existing emotional 
associations, describing propagandistic technique as "the use of symbols which assemble 
emotions after they have been detached from their ideas" (1927, p. 38). At the same time, 
symbols’ affective force persuades audiences to accept claims or conclusions without adequate 
supporting reasons. Like propagandistic emotional appeals more generally, propagandistic use of 
symbols serves to bypass rationality by masking propaganda’s irrational aspects.  
 
1.4 Propaganda as Incitement to Action 
Some scholars have argued that propaganda primarily targets audiences' actions and 
behaviors, not their beliefs or emotions. Perhaps most influential among those advancing this 
view is Jacques Ellul, who argues that "new" propaganda (as contrasted with the "old" war-time 
propaganda) is centrally concerned with "effectiveness" (1965, p. x)22—that is, with 
manipulating audiences into behaving in certain ways.23 Of course, beliefs and emotions are still 
a secondary target, because transforming audiences' behavior will also transform their beliefs, 
desires, and attitudes. Ellul offers a particularly insightful explanation of why targeting behavior 
is ultimately more effective than targeting beliefs or attitudes directly: "He who acts in obedience 
to propaganda can never go back," Ellul writes. "He is now obliged to believe in that propaganda 
because of his past action. He is obliged to receive from it his justification and authority, without 
which his action will seem to him absurd or unjust, which would be intolerable. ... He is what 
one calls committed" (Ibid., p. 29). 
 
22 Ellul goes on to present Nazi Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels as agreeing with this claim, quoting him as 
saying, "We do not talk to say something, but to obtain a certain effect." For an earlier insightful account of the 
techniques by which propaganda incites audiences to action, see chapter 17 in Doob (1948). 
23 Ellul (1965), p. 25: "The aim of modern propaganda is no longer to modify ideas, but to provoke action. It is no 
longer to change adherence to a doctrine, but to make the individual cling irrationally to a process of action. It is no 
longer to lead to a choice, but to loosen the reflexes." 
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Perhaps surprisingly, this view of propaganda as behavior-manipulation is not a 
competitor to, but rather another variant of, the view of propaganda as reason-bypassing. Despite 
the focus on action and behavior, on Ellul's view what’s distinctive of propaganda is still the fact 
that, rather than persuading rationally, it manipulates, "short-circuiting the intellectual process" 
(Ibid., p. 30).  
This short-circuiting occurs in a two-stage process. Before propaganda can actually incite 
any actions, much less produce any habitual behaviors, there must first be a conditioning process 
that sets in place the attitudes and reflexes which later propaganda will exploit (Ibid., p. 32). This 
initial phase thus aims to associate words and other symbols with certain behavioral and affective 
responses, without yet calling for concrete action or connecting its messages to any specific goal 
or issue. This process quite often relies on myths—normatively and affectively powerful images 
shared by a population, like myths of work, happiness, the nation, youth, or the hero (Ibid., p. 
40). Having been abstracted away from a concrete reality, myths come to encompass all that is of 
value—all that is good, just, and true (Ibid., p. 31). “Strongly colored, irrational, and charged 
with all of man's power to believe,” myths can thus spur to action much more effectively than 
rational persuasion could (Ibid., p. 40). 
With the right myth in place, propaganda can mobilize audiences by connecting a 
particular situation or issue with the values encompassed by the myth. Because myths are 
emotionally powerful, appealing to a myth will give the audience a sense of urgency and make 
them feel that action is required. But the myth will also show audiences how to act and assure 
them that such action is appropriate and will lead to success (Ibid., pp. 184, 209).  
 
2. Propaganda's Socio-political Effects 
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In the previous section, we considered various irrational effects that propaganda has on 
individual audience members. But as has been observed from the early days of propaganda 
analysis, propaganda doesn't target individuals merely as individuals, but as members of certain 
groups, communities, or societies. (See, e.g., Bernays, 1928, pp. 44, 55; and Ellul, 1965, pp. 7–
9.) Propaganda exploits the values and sentiments we hold in virtue of our social relations and 
group memberships, both to get our attention and to affect us. Such appeals in turn affect those 
groups, communities, and societies as a whole.  
 
2.1 Legitimizing and Delegitimizing 
The techniques we’ve seen so far—whether they’re aimed at manipulating audiences’ 
beliefs, attitudes, or behavior—can serve to legitimize or delegitimize political or social 
institutions. During a revolution or by a subversive group, agitation propaganda aims to 
delegitimize an established social or political order. It fixates on, exaggerates, or even 
manufactures crises to convince audiences of the urgency of a situation, and it directs audiences' 
anger and hatred into drastic, even violent action, often against some scapegoat or common 
enemy (Ellul, 1965, pp. 72–73). While agitation propaganda is only effective in brief bursts, 
integration propaganda works over long periods of time to produce conformity in audiences' 
thought and behavior, with the aim of legitimizing institutions (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2015, p. 
315).  
Although it's less dramatic and although examples may not come to mind as easily, 
integration propaganda is no less important or paradigmatic than agitation propaganda. In fact, it 
is the more common form, not least because its success depends on its being widespread and 
continuous, repeating its message in a variety of ways in order to gradually, imperceptibly 
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establish or maintain the legitimacy of some institution, in the audience’s mind (Ellul, 1965, pp. 
17–18). Integration propaganda interprets and explains events and issues to the audience, as well 
as rationalizing and justifying the actions of an institution. To perform these tasks, integration 
propaganda exploits and adapts as needed the myths, symbols, values, and ideals that its 
audience already holds.  
Unsurprisingly, integration propaganda is produced by politically, economically, or 
socially dominant groups, but it targets both marginalized groups and the dominant groups 
themselves. For example, economic elites justify maldistributions of wealth by appealing to the 
ideals of individualism, self-sufficiency, and work ethic—legitimizing the existing economic 
order by attributing concentrations of wealth to merit and just desert. Such propaganda serves to 
pacify those without much economic power, redirecting their energies into pursuing the 
individualist ideals. But it also serves an important function for the economic elites; it relieves 
them of guilt by assuring them of the justice and merit of the existing order.24  
Two key outlets for propagating and maintaining these ideals and myths are schools and 
mass media, both of which reach nearly everyone in a modern polity.25 Censorship, though a 
more drastic and hence rarer technique, also serves this legitimizing function, by precluding any 
views which would threaten the standard justification. Conformity in values and ideals, success 
of the proposed rationalization or justification, and the stability of the existing order are 
interdependent: The more widely accepted these myths and ideals are, the more convincing will 
 
24 For a discussion of some of the psychological mechanisms at work in elites' self-justification, see Stanley (2015), 
pp. 224–31. 
25 For the classic discussion of mass media's role in producing conformity in acceptance of the legitimacy of 
economic and political elites, see Herman and Chomsky (1988). For classic discussions of the role of schools in 
propaganda, see Woodson (1933), Althusser (1970). For an in-depth discussion of the role of education, see Stanley 
(2015), pp. 269–91.  
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be the justification, and thus the more effective the propaganda at maintaining the status quo 
(Ellul, 1965, p. 200).  
Another kind of legitimizing propaganda is produced by political bureaucracies, as 
theorized by David Altheide and John Johnson's work on bureaucratic propaganda introduced 
above. Bureaucratic propaganda takes the form of official reports by governments and other 
organizations, which produce such propaganda precisely to legitimize themselves to other 
institutions and to the public more generally (Altheide and Johnson, 1980, p. 18). In particular, 
what legitimates an organization is the scientific, objective appearance of its reports—and by 
extension, its work. By presenting themselves this way, organizations appeal to our 
commitments to rationality and aim to persuade us to accept their work as legitimate as science. 
At the same time, insofar as we already accept similar organizations as legitimate, an 
organization can legitimize itself by demonstrating how its reports and its work function in the 
same way (Altheide and Johnson, 1980, pp. 26–32). As an example, Altheide and Johnson point 
to the increasing bureaucratization and marketization of higher education (Ibid., p. 230). 
Although bureaucratic reports are not produced with an express intention to mislead or 
manipulate, they are aimed to convince superiors and other officials of the legitimacy and 
efficiency of the office producing them. But when the audience of these reports changes, so does 
their effect. Altheide and Johnson argue that when such reports are "disseminated to the public 
via the mass media, their purpose changes. ... For example, police crime statistics are no longer 
merely one way of organizationally accounting for the kind and amount of certain types of work 
done by individuals as a way of justifying expenditures and salaries; crime statistics are now 
regarded as 'objective' indicators of the amount of crime in our society and the threat it poses to 
all her safety unless the tide is turned" (Ibid., p. 18). In such a change of context, bureaucratic 
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propaganda might end up legitimizing a rather different institution than intended, or even—as in 
the case of crime statistics—reinforcing harmful stereotypes. 
 
2.2 In- and Out-Grouping 
Propaganda nearly always exploits some aspect of audiences' social identities, to appeal 
to the associated emotions and values and thereby make itself more effective. But propaganda 
can also aim primarily at producing or maintaining in- and out-group distinctions. While war-
time propaganda is most clearly directed at a specific enemy group, some theorists see it as 
central to all propaganda that it presents a specific socio-political group (e.g., ethnic, national, or 
religious) as Other or even as enemy.26 At the same time, propaganda implicitly defines its 
audience in opposition to this out-group; by identifying the Other, it also identifies Us.27 
The use of stereotypes is clearly central to these goals. Part III of Walter Lippmann’s 
classic 1922 book Public Opinion is called “Stereotypes,” and it is generally considered the 
source of this term in connection with the formation of public opinion. Lippmann argues that 
stereotypes are inevitable, as they allow us to structure the “great blooming, buzzing confusion 
of the outer world” (Lippmann, 1922, p. 63). As he adds, “what matters is the character of the 
stereotypes.” (p. 70). Lippmann characterizes stereotypes as “an ordered, more or less consistent 
picture of the world, to which our habits, our tastes, our capacities, our comforts and our hopes 
have adjusted themselves.” (p. 73) Lippmann argues that stereotypes form the “core of our 
personal tradition, the defenses of our position in society.” (Ibid.) “No wonder,” he adds, “that 
 
26 For example, Ellul maintains that "all propaganda is aimed at an enemy" (1965, p. 152). Megan Hyska (2018) also 
takes polarization as central to propaganda, though she considers a somewhat different kind of polarization than we 
do here. She argues that deliberative polarization, which prevents sub-groups from being able to engage in rational 
debate with one another, is itself a form of propaganda. 




any disturbance of the stereotypes seem like an attack upon the foundations of the universe.” 
(Ibid.) 
Lippmann is clear about the role of stereotypes in justifying hierarchies; indeed, he 
argues that Aristotle’s description of the “natural slave” in his justification of slavery in The 
Politics is “the perfect stereotype.” And Lippmann’s diagnosis of the mistake in Aristotle’s 
argument is that it appeals to this stereotype, which obscures basic facts about the humanity of 
those who are enslaved (p. 75). Key to propaganda’s reason-bypassing function, stereotypes are 
resistant to evidence, in Lippmann’s description “[imposing] a certain character on the data of 
our senses before the data reaches the intelligence.” (Ibid.). And Lippmann is vivid about the role 
stereotypes play in the formation of “friend-enemy distinctions,” a particular form of in-
group/out-group distinction that underlies war and other forms of mass violence. “Out of the 
opposition we make villains and conspiracies.” (p. 101). 
Positive stereotypes of an in-group encourage pride in that social identity, strengthening 
the identification. In forming an “enemy” out-group, negative stereotypes unite the in-group in 
their fear, contempt, fear, or hatred.28 Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels emphasized the 
usefulness of anxiety to this technique and the importance of striking the right balance between 
too much and too little anxiety (Doob, 1950, pp. 438–39). Often alongside stereotypes, historical 
narratives—whether real or revisionist—serve to unite the target audience against some out-
group that is presented as having wronged them. Anti-Semitic Nazi propaganda often cast Jewish 
people not only as the enemy, but also as the scapegoat. For example, a Nazi poster from 1943 
proclaims "Der ist Schuld am Kriege!" ("The war is his fault!"), directing Germans' war-time 
anxieties and frustrations into hatred for Jews. 
 




More subtly, such propaganda can employ the variety of techniques for introducing not-
at-issue content, which we've discussed earlier. Racist dog whistles like "inner city" are an 
especially clear example; they activate audiences' racist prejudices, with plausible deniability for 
the speaker and often without hearers consciously recognizing the problematic message. More 
drastically, such propaganda sometimes employs derogatory language that demeans or even 
dehumanizes members of the out-group. Considering one such example, Lynne Tirrell argues 
that leading up to and during the Rwandan genocide, propaganda calling Tutsis derogatory terms 
like the Kinyarwanda "inyenzi" (cockroach) and "inzoka" (snake) functioned not only to 
encourage attacks on Tutsi communities, but also to normalize and justify such attacks. This 
dehumanizing language associated Tutsis with creatures that evoke disgust and deserve 
extermination. Echoing Ellul’s analysis, Tirrell stresses that derogatory language affects not only 
audiences' beliefs or emotions about the out-group, but their behavior towards the out-group as 
well. "Because of the action-engendering force of derogatory terms," she argues, "actions 
hitherto unthinkable (i.e. the extermination of a people) came to be regarded as socially 
appropriate and even required" (Tirrell, 2012, p. 176).  
Propagandistic appeals to in-group identity and negative attitudes about the out-group 
entrench existing in- and out-group divisions and associated attitudes, but this typically isn't the 
main goal. Rather, the polarization, scapegoating, and pride involved serve some other practical 
interests of the propagandist. Goebbels, for example, noted that one of the functions of 
propaganda is to ease feelings of aggression by directing them into hatred for a specified enemy 
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(Doob, 1950, p. 440).29 Bartlett observes that, although propaganda often invokes a crisis 
threatening the audience's in-group and portrays the threat as coming from outside, "the real aim 
is to organise the enthusiastic elements of the group in support of the current direction of internal 
development" (1940, p. 80). 
At the level of an entire community, another function of in- and out-grouping becomes 
apparent—the homogenization of the in-group's thought, or what Ellul termed crystallization. As 
we’ve already seen homogenization is itself a central goal of integrative propaganda, even in 
instances that don't target any out-group. Stereotypes help produce this homogenization because 
they don't require much effort to interpret and internalize. Via stereotypes, propaganda offers a 
simple, undemanding framework through which the audience can understand the world around 
them.  The more such stereotypical thinking spreads, the more it pushes out competing theories. 
In Ellul's rather cynical conclusion, the result of such a process is that "man can no longer 
modify his judgments and thought patterns" (1965, p. 164). Members of the in-group thus 
become less and less able to take on the thought patterns of members of other groups, further 
deepening the divisions between them.30 
Of course, the effects on the in-group are not the only ones that matter in polarizing a 
community; the manipulation of out-group members also contributes to the polarizing effects.31 
Indeed, members of marginalized groups often internalize the negative stereotypes about them 
 
29 Ellul (1965), p. 152, agrees with Goebbels on this point: "man always has a certain need to hate... Propaganda 
offers him an object of hatred... And the hatred it offers him is not shameful, evil hatred that he must hide, but a 
legitimate hatred, which he can justly feel." In a footnote to these words, Ellul echoes Goebbels even more 
explicitly: "Propaganda thus displaces and liberates feelings of aggression by offering specific objects of hatred to 
the citizen." 
30 Or, in Stanley's words, the result erodes the in-group's empathy and respect for other groups. Stanley (2015), p. 
139. 
31 The difference of the emotional effects on the in-group from those on the out-group can also be thought of in 
terms of propaganda's having two distinct audiences—the group that it aims to alienate from the rest, and the group 
that it aims to unite against them. 
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that are promulgated in the interests of the dominant group.32 The effects produced on the in-
group work alongside those produced on the out-group to strengthen the divisions between them, 
while also often weakening the out-group's social or political standing. That is, propaganda 
doesn't simply refer to existing divisions between in- and out-groups, nor does it merely produce 
such divisions. Rather, it also enforces or even produces a hierarchy between groups. Indeed, the 
very concept of an out-group already suggests a hierarchy: To identify a group as Other isn't to 
make a neutral claim about the world, but rather to present that group as lesser, as undeserving of 
the social status, rights, privileges, and powers that the in-group accords its own members.  
Especially when it's internalized, Othering alienates those members of the out-group who 
are part of the same polity or society as the in-group, and seeing themselves vilified is likely to 
inspire insecurity and even fear among some. When this occurs, members of the out-group begin 
to see themselves as Other, losing trust in their neighbors and political representatives, and losing 
confidence in their own social or political status. When they lose faith in their own social and 
political power, the out-group is liable to really lose such power, as their fear and insecurity 
might mean they make fewer demands, become compliant, and accept a weakened status. For 
example, reports of domestic abuse by non-naturalized residents in the U.S. fell in response to 
increased activity by and publicity for ICE (Engelbrecht, 2018).  
Of course, members of the out-group might instead resist their vilification and alienation, 
reasserting their membership in the polity or society, demanding fair and equal treatment, and 
possibly even launching counter-propaganda. But now that they've been marked out for 
exclusion, the out-group will have to work harder to prove their membership in a shared identity. 
They'll be held to higher standards for behavior that has higher stakes. Moreover, as Stanley 
 
32 For an explanation of how and why marginalized groups accept the flawed ideologies of dominant groups, see 
Stanley (2015), pp. 232–51. 
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argues, if the propaganda they're responding to makes use of implicit stereotypes, members of 
the out-group will have to accommodate "however provisionally, the negative stereotype of their 
group, simply to enter smoothly into any conversation about their group with members of the 
dominating group" (2015, p. 163).  
 
 
3. Normative Status 
Propaganda has a strong negative connotation to many, though not all, English speakers 
today. This is largely a post–World War II phenomenon, recognizable both in ordinary intuitions 
about its connotations, and scholarly writing. Cunningham, for example, maintains that 
propaganda is "an inherently unethical social phenomenon" and argues that "to describe 
propaganda without reference to its unethical complexion is to fractionalize it, and to minimize 
it" (2002, p. 176). Yet it is common to find positive post-war references to propaganda in the 
work of scholars and activists in the African-American tradition. In her 2006 book Bodies in 
Dissent, Daphne Brooks calls the performances of Henry “Box” Brown, who reconstructed his 
dramatic escape from slavery on stage, “part abolitionist propaganda” (p. 66). And in a 1954 
sermon, “Propagandizing Christianity,” Rev. Martin Luther King wrote, “...propaganda does not 
have to be evil. There is a noble sense in which propaganda can be used.” Indeed, “the great 
debate” of the Harlem Renaissance, between W.E.B. Du Bois and Alain LeRoy Locke, was 
about the efficacy of using art as anti-racist propaganda; hence the title of Alain Locke’s 1928 
reply to Du Bois, “Art or Propaganda?” (See Harris, 2004.) 
A relatively simple way to argue for the unacceptability of propaganda is to focus on its 
ill effects, including on the moral status of the actions or behaviors that propaganda provokes (or 
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aims to provoke). This kind of argument is perhaps most convincing in the case of propaganda 
that creates or strengthens ethnic, racial, or religious in-/out-group effects, and particularly 
propaganda that relies on or incites feelings of hatred to do so. Anti-Semitic Nazi propaganda is 
a prime example here. Insofar as it dehumanized and demonized a particular group, that 
propaganda is reprehensible. Moreover, insofar as it encouraged citizens' support for and 
complicity in the Holocaust, Nazi propaganda is reprehensible because it resulted in morally 
reprehensible actions on the part of those citizens.    
A related argument grounds propaganda's reprehensibility in its harming or at least 
opposing the greater social interest. Leonard Doob considers this essential to propaganda, which 
he defines as directed at "ends considered unscientific or of doubtful value in a society at a given 
time" (1966, p. 240). Perhaps surprisingly, on Doob's definition it turns out that certain 
messages, which seem to share propaganda's manipulative techniques or aims, aren't actually 
propaganda. For example, certain governments require cigarette manufacturers to print warnings 
on each pack of cigarettes, to discourage smoking or to encourage smokers to quit. Like many of 
the other pieces of propaganda we've considered, these warnings aim to persuade audiences by 
targeting their emotions and producing an aversive response; they take a catastrophic tone and 
are often accompanied by graphic images depicting the most serious consequences of smoking 
(Stanley, 2015, pp. 58-9). If propaganda is counter to the interest of a polity, and encouraging 
smoking cessation is in the polity's interest, then such warnings are not, according to a view like 
Doob’s, propaganda.  
Parallel arguments have been made in support of the opposite conclusion of Doob’s, that 
there can be morally praiseworthy uses of propaganda, ones which have beneficial outcomes. 
Both Stanley and Marlin develop theoretical accounts of propaganda that include politically, 
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morally, and even (as they argue) democratically acceptable uses of propaganda. Drawing on the 
“civic rhetoric” tradition, Stanley argues that propaganda can be used not just to harm 
democracy, but to repair it, by calling attention to perspectives that ideology has rendered 
invisible (Stanley, 2015, pp. 111ff).33 For example, on the analysis proffered by Daphne Brooks 
(2006), “abolitionist propaganda,” such as Henry Box Brown’s emotionally gutting 
performances of his mailing of himself to freedom, forced his audiences to challenge their own 
racist ideologies, by showing that those who are enslaved not only have agency, but also have a 
powerful desire to exercise it.34 
 Marlin argues that, although propaganda persuades audiences not through rational 
means, there are cases where such persuasion is not only acceptable, but desirable. This is the 
case when the beliefs or values that the propagandist seeks to inculcate are morally good or 
socially desirable ones—such as in elementary education, in particular when the aim is to 
inculcate a moral belief in children (Marlin, 2013, p. 175). He also argues that in some cases, 
propagandistic persuasion is acceptable precisely because it's effective in a way that non-
propagandistic persuasion couldn't be, such as in "the teaching and inculcation of religious belief 
... where purely rational forms of persuasion seem inadequate for the purpose" (Ibid.). As Rev. 
Martin Luther King did before him, Marlin concludes that, insofar as there is a positive value to 
religious faith, and propaganda is the only way to instill such faith, religious propaganda is not 
only acceptable, but even morally praiseworthy.35 
If propaganda is a form of communication, then its being neutral is unsurprising; after all, 
other, non-propagandistic and even non-persuasive forms of communication also come in good 
 
33 For the civic rhetoric tradition, see e.g. Stanley (1983), Garsten (2006), Rogers (2012). 
34 Though see Ellul, 1965, p. 33, arguing that "it is almost impossible to break down racial prejudice by 
propaganda." 
35 Within limits, of course—"notably the point where bigotry and intolerance are encouraged." Ibid. 
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or bad variants. Accordingly, this view of propaganda as neutral is often accompanied, if not 
justified, by framing propaganda as merely a tool, which can be used for good or for evil.36 
Whether or not a particular piece of propaganda is problematic will thus depend on who's using 
the tool and to what ends. For example, Edward Bernays, one of the earliest students of 
propaganda and the “father” of public relations, insisted in 1928 that "whether, in any instance, 
propaganda is good or bad depends upon the merit of the cause urged, and the correctness of the 
information published."37 
Though Stanley (2015), Rogers (2012), Garsten (2006) and others argue that propaganda 
can be democratically acceptable, such as when a democracy is flawed, others argue that 
propaganda is inherently anti-democratic, as it uses anti-democratic methods to achieve results. 
For example, Ellul notes in his preface, "If I am in favor of democracy, I can only regret that 
propaganda renders the true exercise of it almost impossible" (1965, p. xvi).38 
A first pass at spelling out this conflict between democracy and propaganda relies on 
classical liberal notions of legitimate power deriving from the social contract by which the true 
bearers of power (the people) invest governments with power. On this assumption about 
legitimate power, propaganda is incompatible with legitimate government more broadly, and 
democracy in particular, because it's inherently coercive. If propaganda really manufactures 
consent or shapes public will, but democracy depends on citizens' [tacitly] consenting to be 
governed, then a contradiction arises: In the liberal ideal, power flows from the people to the 
government, but with propaganda, the direction seems reversed. 
 
36 See, e.g., Bernays (1928), p. 39: "The instruments by which public opinion is organized and focused may be 
misused. But such organization and focusing are necessary to orderly life." 
37 Bernays (1928), p. 48.  See also Jowett and O'Donnell (2015), p. 397, echoing Bernays in one of the conclusions 
of their rich theory of propaganda as communication: "Propaganda is not necessarily an evil thing. It can only be 
evaluated within its own context according to the players, the played upon, and its purpose." 
38 However, he later argues that propaganda is inevitable in post-industrial, democratic societies; see below. 
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Another tension arises between the conception of a democratic citizen and the conception 
of a propagandee. On the one hand, democracy seems predicated on the idea that every citizen 
makes rational decisions based on their own self-interest. On the other hand, propaganda 
circumvents our rationality, exploits our irrationality, or even makes us irrational (as discussed 
above). So, propaganda either demonstrates the falsity of this fundamental liberal assumption, or 
actively makes it impossible for the assumption to be reality. 
However, the classical liberal views of legitimate political power, individual citizens' 
psychologies and rationality, and individuals' relation to and participation in state activities don’t 
seem to reflect the reality of modern democracies. More realistically, even in a modern 
developed democracy, few if any citizens have the time or even the inclination to be informed 
well enough—not to mention educated adequately—to make rational decisions on every political 
issue. Bernays and Ellul both point to the complexity of modern societies and polities, 
concluding that it would be impossible for any one individual to fully understand all aspects of 
all issues on which they might have an opinion. A democracy, Bernays argues, requires an 
"invisible, intertwining structure of groupings and associations"  to have "organized its group 
mind and simplified its mass thinking" (1928, p. 44). This structure, which includes political 
parties as well as social clubs and informal associations, allows opinions, values, norms, and 
desires to be spread and homogenized, just as fashions are. 
Moreover, to the extent that we do have opinions on a number of political issues, they 
are, constantly in flux, often irrational, and rarely accurately expressed in vote tallies (Ellul, 
1965, p. 124). Propaganda offers a way for citizens to participate (or feel as though they're 
participating), without government policy having to obey such unreasonable and unreliable 
opinions. Ellul argues that "even in a democracy, a government that is honest, serious, 
38 
 
benevolent, and respects the voters" will need to use propaganda (Ibid., p. 126), precisely to shift 
public opinion (or public will) in the desired direction and "make the masses demand of the 
government what the government has already decided to do" (Ibid., p. 132). 
This argument, however, takes a rather cynical view of the average citizen's psychology. 
It depicts, or at least tacitly assumes, that audiences are irrational, ill-informed, and incapable of 
considering complex, nuanced evidence. Bernays is not alone in pointing out that propaganda 
must present simplifications because the average person thinks in terms of clichés (1928, p. 74). 
Ellul, too, argues that, the average citizen in a democracy wants to participate but is incapable of 
considering the full complexities of, say, a foreign policy. Propaganda fulfills this need by 
providing a simple explanation of all the information available to them, a coherent framework 
that can explain and synthesize all the information available to such a citizen, without demanding 
any work on their part (Ellul, 1965, pp. 139-47). The audience are seen not just as poor 
reasoners, but also as ignorant of their own desires or values. Referencing his uncle Sigmund 
Freud, Bernays discusses at length a number of examples of how people are "rarely aware of the 
real reasons which motivate their actions" (1928, p. 74). They're passive, impressionable, and in 
need of guidance from a superior; they have to be told what they want, or at least what they 
should want. 
These (often implicit) assumptions about the audience of propaganda bring to light 
another conflict—one between propagandistic technique and the value of individual autonomy 
central to liberal ideals.  Propaganda presenting false or misleading claims most clearly violates 
the audience's autonomy, in much the way lying does. (See, e.g., Marlin, 2013, pp. 178-79; and 
Stanley, 2015, pp. 57–58.) That is, because it presents false claims as true or misrepresents true 
claims in misleading ways, propaganda fails to treat its audience like free, rational agents. But 
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this argument can also be extended to show that all propaganda is wrong, for the same reasons. 
As Stanley describes this position, "Insofar as a form of propaganda is a kind of manipulation of 
rational beings toward an end without engaging their rational will, it is a kind of deception" 
(2015, p. 58). Thus, even if a piece of propaganda conveys something that is strictly speaking 
true, it may still violate hearers' autonomy, because it manipulates them to take on beliefs, 
desires, values, emotions, or other mental states that they would not have acquired through non-
propagandistic persuasion. 
However even this broad, principled condemnation of propaganda, seems to have some 
exceptions. Marlin points out, for example, that in time of war, rational agents might freely 
choose to be propagandized to, if "the individual rationally accepts both the need for preserving 
the state and, therefore, the obligation to come to its defence when under attack" (2013, p. 179). 
In such cases, we might be willing, or even actively desire, "to be presented with believable 
atrocity stories in order to remove qualms and stimulate more enthusiasm among the troops, thus 
increasing the odds of winning (Ibid., 178–79). Stanley makes an analogous argument about dire 
warnings on cigarette packs: "presumably the idea is that we have tacitly granted our permission 
to the ministry of health to take such steps." (2015, p. 59), concluding that such propaganda is 
only problematic if it’s made without our giving at least tacit consent. 
Most importantly, however, the use of propaganda to repair flawed democracies may be 
democratically legitimate, if its use allows its audience to realize their agency. Flawed ideologies 
- stereotypes that distort the humanity of others, for example - also threaten autonomy. People in 
the grip of flawed ideologies are not fully free - no one thinks that the citizens of North Korea, 
for example, act freely, as they are under the grip of systematic lies. Similarly, a racist, ableist, or 
sexist ideology will lead someone to think they are acting in accord with reason, when they are in 
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fact being duped by flawed stereotypes. Civic rhetoric, propaganda in the service of dismantling 
such flawed ideologies, is thus in the service of restoring democratic agency. This is a 
democratically acceptable goal. Whether the method to achieve it is democratically acceptable is, 
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